

INFANTRY LETTERS



ONE TEAM, ONE FIGHT, ONE FUTURE

I have been an avid reader of *Infantry Magazine* for the past four years and have learned much from this fine publication. I have noticed, however, what appears to be a lack of respect for Army National Guard officers who have been trained through their respective state military academies. (I myself am a proud state military academy graduate, serving as an Active Guard Reservist training officer for a light infantry battalion.)

In your September-December 1998 issue, I noted in a contributing author's biography that he was a graduate of a state military academy, but was not recognized by his rank ("Brazzaville—The Congo: Dying Cities in an Unknown War," by Adam Geibel). While an Army National Guard officer is commissioned to serve his state, he is also expected to serve the President of the United States. How are we different from officers commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)? Both state OCS graduates and ROTC graduates are commissioned as reserve officers and therefore federally recognized by the U.S. Army.

The state military academies of the Army National Guard are doing an outstanding job in developing and preparing young men and women to lead reserve component soldiers in the 21st century. Each state OCS must meet stringent criteria enforced by the Training and Doctrine Command and the Army OCS at Fort Benning, in order to commission and federally recognize officers. How, then, can you deny a National Guard officer his rank? This battalion currently has several state military academy graduates deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation Southern Watch. Their service, sacrifice, and stature should not be regarded any less because they were commissioned through a state OCS.

On 18 June 1998 the Army released the concept of "One Team, One Fight, One Future." This concept is becoming a reality with the reactivation of the 7th Infantry

Division (Light) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), coupling Army National Guard enhanced brigades under a unified active component command. This partnership is a testament to the skill, professionalism, and dedication of hundreds of Army National Guard officers schooled by their state military academies.

With the current downsizing of the military, future wars will be fought by all the Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the active Army. National Guard infantry may again fight alongside its active component brothers as it did so valiantly in World War II and Korea.

One Team, One Fight, One Future.

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EDITOR'S NOTE: While I can understand one's sensitivity to slights—real or imagined—such is not the case with the author of this article.

When no rank is included in an Infantry byline, it is usually the author's preference. Many of our authors are retired—as is the case with the Editor, a retired Regular Army officer—or served for a time before returning to civilian status, and no longer use the ranks they have earned.

Many others of various ranks and sources of commissioning are full-fledged authors or journalists, aside from their military careers, and prefer using the same bylines they use elsewhere. The latter is the case with Adam Geibel.

We fully appreciate all of the officers of the U.S. Army, no matter where they may have earned their commissions, as well as all the noncommissioned officers and civilians who contribute to these pages.

BE VERY CAUTIOUS

I agree with Captain Drew Meyerowich that Battle Drill 6 needs to be replaced (*Infantry*, May-August 1998, page 11). I think,

however, that we should be very cautious about adapting techniques used by SWAT (special weapons and tactics) or HRT (hostage rescue team) units for use in a high-threat MOUT setting.

The Stack bunches up a group of soldiers and then "pours" them through the "fatal funnel" of a window or doorway. While paused alongside the wall outside the entry point, the clearing team is vulnerable to ricochets traveling along the wall and, if the wall construction is typical of many parts of the world, also to fire coming through the wall from the room they are about to clear. Booby traps in the doorways and windows or hand grenades thrown through those points by the enemy would also cause heavy casualties in the entry team because its members are so close together.

Even the adoption of a procedure such as dropping to one knee in the event of a weapon malfunction can lead to some interesting situations. What happens when the #1 man on the entry team has a malfunction while he is in the doorway and takes a knee? It has happened to at least one SWAT team out there, and it was lucky that no one was injured in the resulting doorway jam.

Anyone interested in MOUT small-unit tactics should check out what the Marines have been doing over the past couple of years. The *Marine Corps Gazette* is an excellent source of information. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, in his article "Preparing for Today's Battlefield" (July 1997), presents a detailed explanation of the dangers of "The Stack," the alert or Groucho walk, and the four-man entry when they are applied to a MOUT situation. Also, the April 1999 issue of the *Gazette* is devoted to urban warfare and should be considered must reading for any infantryman. For those with Internet access, the MOUT Homepage is a great starting point for further research: <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/>.

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